ABSTRACT The developments and applications of wireless body area networks (WBANs) for healthcare and remote monitoring have brought a revolution in the medical research field. Numerous physiological sensors are integrated in a WBAN architecture in order to monitor any significant changes in normal health conditions. This monitored data are then wirelessly transferred to a centralized personal server (PS). However, this transferred information can be captured and altered by an adversary during communication between the physiological sensors and the PS. Another scenario where changes can occur in the physiological data is an emergency situation, when there is a sudden change in the physiological values, e.g., changes occur in electrocardiogram (ECG) values just before the occurrence of a heart attack. This paper presents a centralized approach for the detection of abnormalities, as well as intrusions, such as forgery, insertions, and modifications in the ECG data. A simplified Markov model-based detection mechanism is used to detect changes in the ECG data. The features are extracted from the ECG data to form a feature set, which is then divided into sequences. The probability of each sequence is calculated, and based on this probability, the system decides whether the change has occurred or not. Our experiments and analyses show that the proposed scheme has a high detection rate for 5% as well as 10% abnormalities in the data set. The proposed scheme also has a higher true negative rate with a significantly reduced running time for both 5% and 10% abnormalities. Similarly, the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) and ROC convex hull have very promising results.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE number of elderly people in the world's population is increasing significantly. The number of people 60 years of age and over has been projected to reach approximately 700 million by 2009 and 2 billion by 2050 [1] . This will increase the burden on the medical sector. Therefore, scientists are now trying to shift towards personalized remote healthcare solutions. This personalized remote healthcare will help in early prediction and detection of the disease by the continuous and remote monitoring of a patient's health. Such personalized remote healthcare solutions can be achieved using a Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN), which is a special kind of network formed by placing wireless physiological monitoring sensors on the human body [2] - [8] . These sensors measure a patient's vital signs, i.e., electrocardiogram (ECG), electroencephalogram (EEG), and blood pressure, and these are then transmitted to a Personal Server (PS) using wireless communication devices. The PS then transmits this information to the remote medical system to enable remote health monitoring and diagnosis.
In order to provide risk free ubiquitous healthcare facilities, immense work has been done using ECG analysis and diagnosis in recent years. Most of the work in the literature is related to the analysis and diagnosis of Cardiovascular
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Diseases (CVDs) [9] - [11] . In most of the architectures presented in the literature, the analysis and diagnosis are done on medical servers. Hence, there is a need for live and continuous healthcare monitoring to analyze and diagnose chronic diseases. The focus of most of the literature is the detection of abnormalities in the ECG data caused by diseases. However, none of the existing work considered intentional attacks and modifications caused to the data during communication in the case of WBANs. This work considers two situations where the physiological values change. First, the involvement of wireless media makes WBANs very susceptible to attacks like insertions, modifications, and forgeries. Moreover, the physiological status also varies as a result of abnormal conditions of the subject (patient carrying the WBAN) e.g., in the case of CVDs. Attacks on the ECG data during wireless communication may lead to the wrong diagnosis. Similarly, the early detection of changes in the ECG readings may save the user from a massive heart attack and severe consequences. To ensure fully automated, reliable, and continuous ubiquitous health monitoring, it is crucial to detect abnormal conditions and any intrusions or changes in the physiological values. The abnormality, intrusion, or change detection will surely allow clinicians and medical personnel to accurately diagnose CVDs.
In this paper, we present a centralized change detection mechanism for continuous and ubiquitous monitoring using WBANs. Change can be in the form of an intrusion, a modification, or an abnormality. Because of the time-variant nature of the ECG data, a Markov model-based detection mechanism is proposed. ECG is a sequence of data points, measured typically at successive points in time spaced at uniform time intervals. The amplitudes of the ECG frequency components change with time. Therefore, a Markov model is an optimal choice for such time series data. The proposed detection system architecture is depicted in Fig. 1 , where different physiological monitoring sensors are attached to the human body, and a centralized PS collects data from these sensors for real-time abnormal event detection. Moreover, the centralized change detection mechanism runs on the PS to protect the human personal data, and to highlight anomalies and intrusions before sending it for further diagnosis to the medical servers. The system attaches a high priority or emergency tag called an abnormal tag to the data whenever it detects anomalies or intrusions in the data. On the receiving side, when this tag reaches the medical systems, it raises an alarm, and the corresponding medical personnel check the status of the physiological data. The proposed scheme is tested and evaluated with different window sizes and different levels of attack severity. The attack severity increases as we increase the number of insertions and modifications in the data. The proposed scheme has a better True Positive Rate (TPR) and True Negative Rate (TNR), which result in high performance in terms of intrusion detection. Similarly, the scheme shows a very low False Positive Rate (FPR) and False Negative Rate (FNR), which reduce the overburdening of the system. Moreover, the scheme is computationally inexpensive and consumes a very small amount of time for evaluating 10,000 records.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, the background and related literature is discussed. Section 3 elaborates on the proposed change detection system. Section 4 presents experimental analysis and results of our proposed scheme. Finally, section 5 concludes our work.
II. RELATED WORK
Security, privacy, and attack-free communication can lead to an optimal and realistic healthcare system. To ensure attackfree communication in remote healthcare systems, there must be some countermeasures to protect the data and detect any intrusions in the human personal data during wireless communications in healthcare systems. Similarly, the physiological values also change in case of an emergency. Therefore, there should be some measures or techniques to detect these changes in the physiological values during an emergency to provide an early response to the user of the system.
There are some remote and personal healthcare systems in the literature, including CodeBlue [12] , which is an ad hoc sensor network infrastructure for emergency medical care comprising low-power physiological sensors and PDAs. MobiHealth [13] provides an end-to-end healthcare platform for ambulant patient monitoring. The user of MobiHealth is equipped with different sensors that constantly monitor physiological values, e.g., blood pressure and electrocardiogram (ECG) data. A PDA-based PatientMonitoring System [14] uses a PDA to monitor physiological data such as the heart rate, electrocardiogram, and SpO2. In [15] , the authros use an IoT based data accessing scheme for ubiquitous emergency medical services. The authors in [16] propose a smarthome-based health monitoring and medicine packaging using IoT where the main services of the system are health monitoring, emergency response, and intelligent pharmaceutical packaging (iMedPack) with communication capability of passive radio-frequency identification (RFID) and actuation capability enabled by functional materials. Most of these systems focus on the architecture and services. Some consider F. A. Khan et al.: Continuous Change Detection Mechanism to Identify Anomalies in ECG Signals secure communications, but none of the systems provide services for attack mitigation or change detection in the physiological data.
There are some schemes in the literature for detecting anomalies in the ECG data for arrhythmia detection [17] , cardiomyopathy [18] , and coronary blood flow abnormalities [19] . In this regard, [20] gives a cluster-based approach for detecting cardiovascular abnormalities in the ECG data. Characteristic frequencies are assigned to the compressed ECG data, and then the correlations between these frequencies are obtained. On the basis of these correlations, two clusters, i.e., normal and abnormal, can be formed. In [14] , ECG biometrics are used for detecting cardiovascular diseases. The scheme in [21] is based on the idea that the characteristic frequencies taken from compressed ECG data at enrollment and recognition are the same. Similarly, in [11] , R-wave events are detected using geometrical techniques. The R-wave detection will help to evaluate and predict abnormal cardiac rhythms. Similarly, there are schemes that consider the detection of abnormalities in ECG data using mobile devices [22] , [23] . Although these schemes detect abnormalities like CVDs in ECG data, they do not consider the detection of intentional changes made by an attacker. Moreover, most of the above schemes run on hospital servers, and hence do not provide continuous and ubiquitous patient monitoring. The scheme proposed in this paper learns and detects new changes (i.e., anomalies and attacks) on the basis of the learned behavior.
There are some Markov model-based schemes for intrusion detection in wireless sensor networks (WSN). In this regard, [24] uses a classifier method for the detection of intrusions in log files using a Hidden Markov Model (HMM). The scheme uses an HMM and a k-mean for the classification of normal and abnormal traffic data. An intelligent mobile robot response system was presented in [25] , which used enhanced fuzzy Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) for learning and a Markov model for intrusion detection in a WSN. Another example is the use of a non-parametric version of HMM [26] for intrusion detection. The scheme uses scores and deviation alarms when the behavior changes.
The above healthcare systems are prone to attacks and modifications during wireless communications. If by any chance an attacker succeeds in forging and modifying human personal information during communication in remote healthcare systems, it will lead to a wrong diagnosis, which will ultimately result in serious consequences for the user of the healthcare system. Because of the harsh wireless communication environment, there is a need to incorporate a proper intrusion and modification detection system in the remote healthcare systems. Similarly, the abovementioned Markov model-based schemes used for intrusion detection were designed by considering the specific requirements of the WSN. None of the Markov model-based schemes considered medical applications and WBANs.
In this paper, the proposed scheme uses a Markov model to detect modifications and abnormal behavior in the ECG data, as shown in Fig. 2 . In Fig. 2 , the red lines in the plot represent abnormal behavior, while the blue lines show the normal behavior. An ECG signal has the characteristics of time series data, where the amplitude of the signal changes as the time progresses. Keeping in mind the time series characteristics of the ECG data, Markov model-based intrusion and change detection is done for qualitative, reliable, and ubiquitous healthcare services. The proposed scheme helps to detect forgeries and modifications performed by an attacker to misguide the diagnosis process. In the same way, the proposed scheme will detect the abnormal behavior that occurs in case of a heart attack emergency. Moreover, the scheme learns the behavior of the changes and attacks. Whenever a new type of change or attack occurs, the scheme successfully detects and raises an alarm in the medical systems. For example, if there are some abrupt changes in the ECG data of a patient, the system will notify the clinicians prior to the heart attack.
III. PROPOSED CENTRALIZED CHANGE DETECTION SYSTEM
A WBAN-based remote healthcare system uses sensor devices for physiological monitoring, and then the sensed data are transferred to the medical servers for experts and clinicians for analysis and diagnosis. In our proposed system, all the physiological sensors are attached to a PS, which collects the physiological data from the sensors and then, after applying the intrusion and anomaly detection mechanism, sends the data along with the associated normal or abnormal tags to the medical servers. The clinicians then decide whether the condition of the patient under continuous observation is normal or needs an emergency response. If the condition is normal, the proposed system observes and evaluates the ECG data, detects attacks, and informs the patient as well as the clinicians about the attack. Our proposed architecture is depicted in Fig. 3 , and is based on the following main steps:
A. FEATURE EXTRACTION
In this step, the PS extracts features from the physiological values received from the sensor nodes. All the physiological sensors sample the ECG values at a specific sampling rate and fixed duration of time. Then, by applying a Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT), the features are extracted from the ECG signal. All the sensor nodes extract the features and send them to the PS. The PS also extracts its set of features from the ECG signal. The set of features (FeatureSet PS ) from the PS are used for training, while the sensor node's features (FeatureSet SN ) are used for testing purposes.
B. Markov MODEL-BASED CHANGE DETECTION MECHANISM
Let us assume that {X t , t ∈ T} is a sequence of random variables, where T = Z+ ={0,1,2,3. . . }. This sequence has a Markov property [29] if it satisfies the following conditions: 1) For any t ∈ T, the future process at t -, (X t -, where t -> t and t -∈ T) is independent of any past processes (X γ , where γ < t and γ ∈ T).
2) The conditional probability distribution of such future process (X t -) (where t -> t and t -∈ T) depends only upon the present state (X t , t ∈ T)
In other words, if X t belongs to some countable set of states (S), then {X t , t ∈ Z+} will satisfy the Markov property if and only if
The set of such countable states (S) is called the Markov chain. Therefore, a Markov chain can be defined as a mathematical model of random variables that evolve over time in such a manner that the future is affected only by the present and is independent of the past events.
1) Markov MODEL
A random variable X will be called a discrete random variable if it is finite or countably infinite and conforms to the following condition:
x P (X = x) = 1, where x is each possible value of random variable X. The probability mass function (pmf) of two such discrete variables, X0 and X1, is defined as
In the same way, for a total of n+1 such discrete random variables, X 0 , X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n , the joint probabilities can be expressed as
The initial probability of state x 0 ∈ S is defined as
and the other conditional probability chunks of (1) are denoted as
The joint probability distribution in (1) can be simplified using (2) and (3) as follows:
The function q x 0 in (2) is called the Initial Distribution, and p x n ,x n+1 in (3) is called the Transition Probability from state x n at time n to state x n+1 at time n+1.
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The transition probability is described in a more convenient manner as follows:
The transition probability matrix (P) is a matrix representation of the transition probabilities. Let p ij be the transition probability of a system that is in state j at time t+1 and whose previous state was i at time t [25] - [27] . If the system has a total of ''n'' states, P will be defined as
A Markov model is a stochastic process. Hence, the sum of the probabilities of transitioning from state i to some other states will be 1, i.e., the sum of each row of transition matrix P will be equal to 1.
By observing a system's behavior, the transition probability, as well as the initial probability, can be calculated. Let N ij = the total number of observations where X t is in state i at time t and X t+1 is in state j at time (t+1).
If M = the total number of observations where X t is in state i and X t+1 is in any one of the states 1, 2, 3, . . . , n, N i = the number of X t in state i, and N = the total number of observations, then
and
2) Markov MODEL-BASED ECG ANALYSIS SCHEME This section elaborates on the application of the Markov model to intrusion and abnormality detection in the time series ECG data. The Markov model is used to represent the temporal profile of the normal behavior of the continuously collected ECG data set. Our target is to detect any abnormalities or intrusions in a human ECG pattern in real-time and continuous health monitoring systems. For the detection of intrusions and anomalies in the ECG data, normal ECG values, i.e., measured by the PS itself (FeatureSet PS ), are used to compare with the testing dataset, i.e., measured by the physiological sensors (FeatureSet SN ). The ECG dataset collected from [28] contains a total of 310 ECG recordings of 90 different persons. There were 44 male and 46 female volunteers ranging in age from 13 to 75. Some records were collected periodically over 6 months. For experimental purposes, the first ECG records for persons 1 to 25 are used. The header (.hea) file of these records contains information about the person's age, gender, recording date, etc. Each record contains raw as well as filtered data signals. The filtered signals are used here for analysis and experimentation. Each ECG record contains a total of 10,000 signal values at 0.002-s intervals. An ECG signal value is denoted in millivolts, which varies in the ±10 mV range. In order to reduce the dimensions of the ECG data for better classification and improved detection, a Haar-based discrete wavelet transformation (DWT) is applied to the signal. With the goal of reducing the number of random variables from the ECG dataset, the dimensions were reduced by 50% in each record using DWT. The reduced set of data is further used for abnormality and intrusion detection.
Moreover, to validate our scheme, some user-defined intrusive data are imposed on the normal dataset in random locations of the collected ECG patterns, which is then used as testing data. Both 5% and 10% insertions and modifications are randomly injected into the dataset to prepare it for testing purposes. Thus, these testing datasets contain 95% and 90% normal patterned data, respectively.
3) TRAINING
In order to train the system, PS uses its own measured ECG feature set, i.e., FeatureSet PS . This is done because the sensor nodes and PS reside on the same body, and hence measure similar ECG values. It is worth mentioning here that the ECG values measured at two different locations on the same body may have slight differences, but these differences can be eliminated or rectified by using some correction or reconciliation schemes [8] , [30] . Moreover, as the scheme runs on the PS, the PS uses its own feature set of normal ECG data to train the system. The system builds a simplified Markov model by learning a transition probability matrix, as well as the initial probability distribution from normal ECG data. An observation window size N (20, 40, and 60) is used to divide the whole ECG signal into different set of states. For a total of M states (M − N + 1), different sets of states of size N will be available. The sequence of states for each chunk will remain the same. The steps of the proposed scheme are shown in Algorithm 1.
4) TESTING
After performing training, the system was able to detect any abnormality and change in the ECG data. For testing purposes, the feature set (FeatureSet SN ) received from sensor nodes is passed through the system. Hence,
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Algorithm 1 Implementation of Markov Chain in ECG data 1. Initialization: Observation Window Size = w; 2.
Step 1:
Calculate total number of ECG data instance (M). Calculate total number of unique ECG data instance (U). Total_Number_of_Unique_Data (u) ≤ Total_Number_of_Data (m) 3.
Step 2:
Assign unique index number to Unique ECG data instances, start from 0 to (u-1). Set of available states, X = {X u , 0 ≤ u <U} 4.
Step 3:
Extract ECG States based on original ECG data. Label as training dataset.
Step 4:
Rename the time-based sequence of states available in training data with respect to state number available in X. Training Data Set, TD = (X v ) t , 0 ≤ v < u, t = 0,1,2,. . . 6.
Step 5:
Calculate initial distribution of set of states, X. Calculate transition probability, P ij (0 ≤ i,j ≤ u) of state transition from one state to another. Transition probability is based on Training Data Set, TD. 7.
Step 6:
Label Testing Data Set (TS) as in Step 4 and split the Testing Data Set into different chunk of entries (Si), termed as chunk of sequence Si = (X i , X i+1 , X i+2 , X i+3 ,. . . , X i+w−1 ) where, 0 ≤ i ≤ m-w+1 and m = |TS| 8.
Step 7:
Calculate probability of occurrence of each sequence (Si), P (S i ) = P (X i , X i+1 , . . . ,X i+w−1 )
=q X i w t=i+1 P X t−1 X t , where0 ≤ i < m − w + 1
9.
Step 8: Assign a Threshold value (τ ) for detecting the effected sequences. The probability of sequence (P(Si)) lesser than Threshold value (τ ), will confirm chance of abnormal changes. i.e., P(Si) <= τ , detect abnormalities sequence using (4).
The feature set contains 5% and 10% attack data, placed at random locations. If a total of M states are divided into (M − N + 1) sliding windows of size N , each chunk (S i ) will contain N entries. If the probability is higher than a predefined threshold, the tendency of the sequence increases toward normal. On the other hand, if some sequence of states receives lower (tending to 0) probability scores, then there is a chance of an abnormality or intrusion activity in that sequence. This can be seen in Fig. 5 , where a red line represents a threshold value. Touching the threshold raises an alarm.
5) NUMERICAL REPRESENTATION OF PROPOSED SYSTEM
In this section, we represent the process of detecting changes in a sample data set. For training purposes, time series data with 27 (i.e., (x t , t), 0<t<27) states are given below. Let our exemplar data set contains a total of five unique states ({x u , 0 ≤ u <5} ). These states are discrete random variables, which are countably infinite. Thus, unique states = {x u , 0 ≤ u <5} = (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) State occurrence = {(x u , t), where 0 ≤ u <5 and 0<t<27}. Here, ''t'' is the time index, which is incremented by 1 when a state changes to the same or a different state. The states are independent of the time t. For example, if at time t=0, the present state is x 0 , the next state at t=1 will be any one of (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ), i.e., the next state = {x u }, 0 ≤ u <5.
The state occurrence of sample data is given as S = (x 0 , x 2 , x 1 , x 3 , x 4 , x 3 , x 3 , x 2 , x 0 , x 4 , x 2 , x 2 , x 0 , x 2 , x 3 , x 0 , x 4 , x 3 , x 1 , x 1 , x 2 , x 2 , x 0 , x 1 , x 4 , x 3 , x 1 ). The initial distribution for five unique states can be calculated using (8) .
Thus, the initial distribution q = [0.185, 0.185, 0.259, 0.222, 0.148].
The transition probability matrix can be calculated using (7). The last state in the sample data is given as x 1 . As the sample data set is continuous, we expect another state as x 4 even after the last state of S. Here, the transition probability matrix is represented, where the transition probability from one state to another is rounded off to two decimal places. 
The sum of each row of P is equal to 1, i.e., n j=1 p ij = 1 is satisfied.
Based on the transition probability and initial distribution, any new sequence behavior can be measured. Let another set of states be S New = (x 0 , x 2 , x 1 , x 3 , x 4 , x 1 , x 3 , x 2 , x 0 , x 3 , x 2 , x 2 , x 0 , x 2 , x 3 , x 0 , x 4 , x 3 , x 1 , x 1 , x 2 , x 2 , x 0 , x 1 , x 4 , x 3 , x 1 ). However, the transition matrix is already created using the training data set S. This matrix information is essential for identifying any abnormalities in the future set of transition states. The initial distribution of unique states along with the transition from one state to another are the bases for the abnormality assessments. Let us assume that there are some changes in the set of states S New . Some intrusion or abnormality has occurred in the sixth and tenth position of the data set S New of the same profile. Our target is to detect any changes in such a time series data. For experimental purposes, let us take an observation window size of N = 4 with a hop size of 1. Thus, the sequence of states will be divided into (|S New |-N+1) = 24 chunks, where the chunks are represented as C k , 1≤ k ≤ (|S New |-N+1). The elements in each chunk are given below: C 1 = (x 0 , x 2 , x 1 , x 3 ), C 2 = (x 2 , x 1 , x 3 , x 4 ), C 3 = (x 1 , x 3 , x 4 , x 1 ), C 4 = (x 3 , x 4 , x 1 , x 3 ), C 5 = (x 4 , x 1 , x 3 , x 2 ), . . . , C 24 = (x 1 , x 4 , x 3 , x 1 ). The occurrence probability of each chunk in our system will be calculated using (4) . 
185) . (0.40) . (0.75) .(0.33) = 0.018315
After calculating the joint probability of each chunk, a threshold probability is defined. A higher probability indicates a greater likelihood that a chunk in the sequence state deviates from the normal behavior [31] . Abnormal or forged activities are expected in those sequences of states where the probabilities of the chunks are very low (below the threshold). The probabilities of the chunks of the sequence, with their states, are listed in Table 1 .
The threshold value is calculated based on the normal profile behavior. The occurrence probability of each chunk in the normal profile dataset S is calculated to find out the sequence of states, which has the lowest probability value. Nevertheless, we have followed the same steps to calculate the occurrence probability of the normal profile as stated earlier in this section. The particular state sequence number, for which the sequence probability is minimum, is identified using equation (10) .
It is found that for the value m = 2, the chunk C 2 (which contains the (x 2 , x 1 , x 3 , x 4 ) sequence of states) produces the lowest value out of any other sequence combinations in the normal circumstances. The probability corresponding to the chunk C 2 is calculated as 0.001, which is identified as the lowest probability among the other chunks in the normal profile conditions. The threshold is assigned a value, which is lesser than the lowest occurrence probability among the chunks (i.e., P(C 2 )) in a normal profile. We assigned the threshold as a fraction lower (i.e., 0.0001) than the lowest occurrence probability among the chunks (i.e., 0.001) available in the training data. Using equation (11), the threshold value is calculated as 0.0009 for the particular profile. The chunks whose probabilities are lower than the threshold τ , are supposed to contain some abnormal states in the corresponding chunks. It can be noticed from Table 1 that the probabilities of chunk numbers C 3 , C 4 , C 5 , C 7 , C 8 , and C 9 are lower than the predefined threshold. The proposed model identifies that there may exist some abnormalities in these six chunks. It is clear from Fig. 4 that these particular six chunks of sequences satisfy the abnormality condition as the probabilities of the occurrence of these sequences are below the threshold value. In the figure, the red line is marked as the threshold value. However, the threshold value is not fixed for different profiles. The threshold value is highly dependent on the training data of a normal profile. For each profile (i.e., patient), it is necessary to calculate the threshold value using the sufficient set of normal data. The more the satisfactory normal dataset is used as the training; the chances of generating the suitable threshold for the particular profile become high. 
6) Markov CHAIN TRANSITIONS
A state transition system consists of a set of transition states, transition relations, and a set of initial states. A transition is basically a set of rules that is responsible for changing states from the source to the target. Different possible transitions that can occur in the proposed model are described in the subsections below. A total of four different types of transitions are available in our system.
Consider the case where Ni represents a normal chunk. Ni contains a total of w states. The initial state is represented as s 0 ∈ S. t 11 is the condition for checking the normality of any chunk. After applying the Markov model on chunk Ni, if the joint probability of chunk Ni is lower than some threshold value (which is to be set by observing the normal system behavior), the next stage will be treated as normal (Nj) with initial state s 1 . Here, the initial state will be changed to the state that is next to the initial state of chunk Ni. For example, assume window size w = 5 and let us assume that there are a total of six states available in the system, S = (S 0 , S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 , S 5 ). As w = 5, so N i and N j will be treated as a chunk with a total of five elements, i.e.,
A sequence of states is available as follows: S 2 , S 3 , S 1 , S 3 , S 4 , S 2 , S 5 , S 1 , S 3 , S 4 , S 0 , S 1 , S 1 , S 0 , S 4 . We take the chunk, N i , which occurs in the following sequence: S 2 , S 3 , S 1 , S 3 , S 4 . The initial state here is s 0 = S 2 . After applying the Markov Model on N i , if it satisfies the normal condition (a 1 ), the process will reach the next stage. In this case, N j will be the next chunk whose states of occurrence will be S 3 , S 1 , S 3 , S 4 , S 2 . Here, the initial state s 1 = S 3 . This clearly shows a normal-to-normal transition.
In this case, if the joint probability after applying the Markov Model on chunk N i satisfies the abnormality condition (t 12 ), the next sequence of states (A j ) will be abnormal. Here, the initial state will be changed from s 0 to s 1 in the next transition. This type of scenario shows a normal to abnormal transition.
Let us suppose that a system is in an abnormal state and the initial state is s 0 . If the probability of the sequence in A i with respect to the initial state satisfies the normal condition (t 21 ), the next chunk of the sequence (N j ) will be in the normal state. This scenario shows the transition from an abnormal to a normal state.
In this case, an abnormal state (A i ) will be unchanged (A j ) if the probability of chunk A i , which contains some sequence of states of size w, still satisfies the abnormality condition (t 22 ). If A i = (S 1 , S 3, S 4, S 0 ), when s 0 = S 1 , A j will be the sequence (S 3, S 4, S 0 , S 1 ) with s 1 = S 3 . In this case, both A i and A j will be in the abnormal condition.
These transitions are depicted in Fig. 5 , and a similar transition from the initial state to the final state with the corresponding transition probability is shown in Table 2 . Moving from the initial state i 1 to the final state j 1 at time t will require the value of the integral multiplications of the probability mass functions.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
This section provides a detailed description of the experiments and a discussion on the generated results.
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In order to perform different experiments and analyses, we use Java and MATLAB-based simulations. The dataset is taken from MIT-PHYSIOBANK [28] , and we use different records taken from the ECG recordings of 25 persons. For an in-depth analysis, we examine the effect of increasing the window size on the detection rate and running time performance of the proposed scheme. The experiments are performed for different window sizes of 20, 40, and 60. Similarly, the experiments are done using 5% and 10% attack data.
B. RUNNING TIME
The experiments are performed using the data from 25 subjects, where each data set contains 10,000 values. The experiments are performed for different window sizes of 20, 40, and 60, with 5% and 10% intrusive data. On average, the schemes take almost 2.6 s to detect and evaluate the 5% and 10% intrusive data. Hence, it is evident from Table 4 that the total running time for a particular experiment is 2.6s. The running time analysis shows that the proposed scheme is usable in limited resource networks like WBANs for continuous monitoring and security provisioning.
C. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Since WBANs use wireless technologies for communication, most of the threats inherent in WSNs can also be launched against WBANs [32] . In Table 3 , some of the attacks that can be launched against the proposed scheme and are able to modify the ECG values in order to disturb the diagnosis process are described.
For the security analysis, the proposed scheme is analyzed and evaluated in terms of the True Positive Rate (TPR), True Negative Rate (TNR), False Positive Rate (FPR), and False Negative Rate (FNR). The experiments are performed for various window sizes, and as we increase the window size, a slight variation is observed in the TPR or detection rate, as can be seen in Tables 4 and 5 . Thus, we conclude that the increase in window size affects the performance of the proposed scheme in terms of the intrusion and anomaly detection. Similarly, it is also observed that, when we increase the insertion and modification percentage from 5% to 10% intrusive data, the detection rate decreases. Moreover, the TNR has maximum value of 99.8% for the 5% attack or abnormal data, and 98.7% for the 10% attack or abnormal data, which clearly draws a line between the normal and intrusive or abnormal data.
Similarly, the FPR interprets the false alarms raised by the system when it calls a normal sequence or record of data intrusive or abnormal. The proposed scheme limits the FPR to 2.8% at the maximum for the 5% attack or abnormal data, and 2.4% for the 10% attack or abnormal data. Moreover, the FNR presents a scenario where there is an attack or abnormality in the data but the scheme did not raise an alarm. In this scenario, the scheme fails to detect the abnormality or intrusion in the data. In our experiments, the proposed scheme restricted FNR to 7.1% at a maximum for the 5% attack or abnormal data, and 12.8% for the 10% attack or abnormal data.
Similarly, the maximum precision (Prec.) of the proposed scheme is 97.5% in the case of the 5% attack or abnormal data, and 98.3% on for the 10% attack or abnormal data. This shows the accuracy and usefulness of the proposed scheme in the presence of some abnormality or attack. A Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is a two dimensional depiction used to evaluate and analyze the performance of any detection system. The ROC curve depicts the dependence of the FPR (i.e., accepted imposter attempts) on the TPR (i.e., accepted legitimate attempts). Similarly, the Area Under Receiver Operating Characteristic (AUROC) summarizes the total accuracy of the intrusion detection system. The AUROC number always ranges from 0.5 to 1.0, and the worst ROC curve lies along the positive diagonal y = x and has the corresponding area of 0.5. The best ROC curve lies on the y-axis, reaches the top corner (0, 1), and has an area of one.
When the corresponding area approaches 0.5, this means that the probability of the anomaly or intrusion detection is 50%. On the other hand, when it reaches one, this means that the probability of an anomaly or intrusion is 100%.
It is evident from Fig. 7 that for the 5% attack or abnormal data with a window size of 20 and a 90% threshold, the AUROC is 0.967391 and AUROCCH is 0.967391. Similarly, in Fig. 8 , when we increase the window size to 40, the AUROC and AUROCCH decrease to 0.760870 and 0.782609, respectively.
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In Fig. 9 , the AUROC and AUROCCH decrease to 0.652174 and 0.728261, respectively, for the window size of 60. Fig. 10 shows that for the 10% attack or abnormal data with the window size of 20 and the 90% threshold, the AUROC is 0.690476 and ROCCH is 0.726190.
Similarly, in Fig. 11 , when the window size increases to 40, AUROC becomes 0.645833 and AUROCCH becomes 0.651042. In Fig. 12 , when the window size increases to 60, AUROC decreases to 0.574561 and AUROCCH decreases to 0.631579.
V. CONCLUSION
Detecting the changes that occur in ECG readings in continuous health monitoring systems is very hard. This abnormality detection task becomes more difficult when there is a chance of erroneous communication or some attacker intentionally introduces errors or makes changes in the patient's personal data during wireless communication. Our proposed work detects changes or abrupt variations in the ECG data. Similarly, it learns the behavior and detects new changes on the basis of this learned behavior to inform medical personnel by raising an alarm in the hospital systems. Moreover, the proposed scheme mitigates forgery, unauthorized insertions, and modifications in the ECG data, hence preventing misleading data in the diagnosis process. The proposed scheme shows good results in terms of its detection rate, true negatives, and running time complexity, which make it a better choice for resource-constrained WBANs.
In the future, the proposed system will be enhanced by automatically labeling the illegal attack and emergency heart attack. In this case, a semi-supervised system will be integrated with our proposed system, which will notify the corresponding abnormality indexes with timestamps and patient IDs to the medical representative. It is the responsibility of the clinicians to promptly contact patients to check their physical conditions. In case the patients suffer from symptoms related to an emergency heart attack, the clinician will inform the system about the emergency. On the other hand, if the system has already alerted about some abnormality and the clinicians have confirmed it as a normal heart condition, then the system will treat it as an intrusive activity happened around the time frame. Based on the clinicians' input, a semi-supervised model will be presented to label the illegal and emergency heart attacks. His broader research interests are in ICT security, specifically interested in security of low-powered mobile devices and also in biometric security, cyber security, IoT security, cloud computing security, information assurance, trust management, and forensic computing. 
